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Abstract 
Communication is central to the effectiveness of nonviolent action: methods of protest and 
persuasion are essentially means of communication, while methods of noncooperation and 
nonviolent intervention have crucial communicative dimensions. As a mode of political 
communication, nonviolence can be contrasted with rational dialogue, electoral politics and violence, 
and stands out from them in combining high transformative potential with dialogue and participation. 
The more well studied dimensions of nonviolence as communication are dialogue with opponents, 
power equalization to prepare for dialogue, and mobilization of third parties. To these should be 
added two further dimensions, collective and individual empowerment. Two cases of nonviolent 
resistance in the Soviet Union - the 1991 coup and the 1953 prison camp strikes at Norilsk and 
Vorkuta - are used to illustrate the dimensions of nonviolence as communication in practice. These 
examples reveal the importance of communication in nonviolent action. They also suggest the 
difficulty in gaining information on empowerment, especially individual empowerment, which may 
be one reason why these dimensions have been neglected. The five-dimension framework of 
nonviolence as communication has the limitation that many actions mix two or more dimensions. 
Examining the communicative dimensions of nonviolence can alert both activists and researchers to 
the fact that nonviolent actions do not 'speak for themselves'. 
  
Introduction 
The briefest examination of nonviolent action reveals that communication is essential to its 
effectiveness. A number of methods of nonviolent action, such as organizing petitions, holding 
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rallies and wearing symbols of resistance, are means of communicating both the activists' concerns 
and their willingness to express them. Gene Sharp (1973) classifies methods of nonviolence into 
three categories: nonviolent protest and persuasion; noncooperation; and intervention. All the 
methods that he categorizes as protest and persuasion can be interpreted as forms of communication. 
Methods of noncooperation, which include numerous types of strikes and boycotts, also have 
powerful communicative roles, to both opponents and third parties, by demonstrating willingness to 
act. Methods of intervention, such as sit-ins and fasts, have similar communicative functions. 
Considering the importance of communication to nonviolence, it is surprising that nonviolence 
researchers have so rarely used communication perspectives. Likewise, communication researchers 
have not examined nonviolent action, at least not with any explicit awareness of nonviolence theory. 
[1] In this article, we take a preliminary look at how communication perspectives can be used to 
offer insight into nonviolence theory and practice. 
We begin by discussing the communicative aspects of the two main nonviolence traditions, namely 
principled nonviolence epitomized by Gandhi and pragmatic nonviolence epitomized by Sharp. Then 
we compare nonviolent action with three other modes of political communication - rational 
discourse, electoral politics and violence - in order to assess the special characteristics of 
nonviolence as communication. Next we examine several different dimensions of nonviolence as 
communication: persuasion of opponents, power equalization, dialogue among nonviolent activists, 
mobilization of third parties, and self-transformation. To illustrate the role of these dimensions in 
practice, we examine two instances of nonviolent action in the Soviet Union, resistance to the 1991 
coup and strikes at Norilsk and Vorkuta prison camps in 1953. 
  
Communication in Nonviolent Action 
The theory and practice of nonviolent action can be conveniently divided into two traditions: 
principled nonviolence (often called satyagraha) and pragmatic nonviolence (Burrowes, 1996: 112-
115; Stiehm, 1968). In principled nonviolence, refusal to use violence is a moral imperative, based 
for example on the sanctity of human life. Gandhi is the most prominent figure from this tradition, 
which can be traced back to Leo Tolstoy and others (Bondurant, 1958; Gandhi, 1927/1929; Gregg, 
1934; Shridharani, 1939). Given that behaving morally is central to this approach, the effectiveness 
of nonviolent action is a secondary consideration, but important nevertheless. Gandhi, an astute 
practitioner (Sharp, 1979), argued that nonviolent action worked through the process of conversion: 
satyagrahis (principled nonviolent activists), demonstrating their commitment by refusing to fight 
back against attacks, would 'melt the hearts' of their opponents. Since principled nonviolence is 
founded in a belief that behaviour flows out of the core values of a person, it is only sensible to 
conclude that conversion - namely, changing the opponents' core values - is the mechanism by which 
nonviolent action should bring about change. 
If conversion is the means, then communication is essential; Ramana Murti (1968) goes further and 
says that nonviolence is communication. The calm perseverance of satyagrahis in the face of brutal 
assault can lead to attackers reassessing their own values, but of course this requires that the 
attackers actually perceive the behaviour of the satyagrahis. Pilots in a plane dropping bombs, or 
scientists designing the bombs, are unlikely to see protesters at all. But more than information flow is 
required: as well, the activists' behaviour must create or resonate with opponents' understandings, [2]
otherwise there is no prospect of conversion. If the activists are seen as behaving stupidly or 
bizarrely, there is little prospect of understanding or sympathy by the opponents. In communicative 
terms, a requirement for the effectiveness of nonviolent action is that channels are open and that 
relevant meanings are produced. 
While there are certainly some individual cases of conversion through nonviolent action, evidence 
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for conversion as a general process is absent. Thomas Weber (1993) analysed the case of Gandhi's 
salt satyagraha of 1930, in which satyagrahis meekly endured brutal assaults by police wielding 
wooden batons. But this did not lead the police assaulters to alter their beliefs. If anything, the 
acquiescence of the satyagrahis made them become more ferocious in attack. The effectiveness of 
the campaign came from another communicative process. Western journalist Webb Miller reported 
on the campaign for an international audience; information about the attacks caused outrage in 
countries such as Britain and the United States. The nonviolent action thus had its biggest impact on 
third parties - those not directly involved in the confrontation - via messages produced by an 
observer. From Weber's analysis it can be concluded that communication was central to Gandhi's 
successes, but that it was not primarily through what Gandhi thought was the central means, 
conversion, but rather through mobilization of third party opinion. 
The second main tradition, pragmatic nonviolence, is based on the assumption that nonviolent action 
is more effective than other means of action for opposing aggression and oppression, in particular 
more effective than violence. As noted earlier, Gene Sharp, the most prominent exponent of 
pragmatic nonviolence, divides the methods of nonviolent action into three types (Sharp, 1973). [3] 
First is nonviolent protest and persuasion: typical methods include petitions, banners, picketing, 
wearing of symbols, fraternization, singing, pilgrimages, demonstrative funerals, teach-ins and walk-
outs. These methods can all be interpreted as means of communication to the opponent. One means 
by which these methods can work is through conversion, as in principled nonviolence, but there are 
other possibilities. For example, opponents might perceive the passion or organization of the 
activists and decide to treat their message more seriously, without being convinced or converted. 
Sharp's second category of nonviolent action is noncooperation, which includes social 
noncooperation such as ostracism, stay-at-home and suspension of sporting events, economic 
noncooperation covering numerous types of boycotts and strikes, and political noncooperation such 
as stalling, refusal to accept appointed officials, and withholding of diplomatic recognition. Again, 
these forms of action have important communicative dimensions, for example revealing concerns, 
organization, and ability to change behaviour. It is commonplace that a strike can send a strong 
message to employers, stronger than claims by trade union leaders in negotiations, about the unity, 
commitment and power of the workers. Communication of course need not involve words: 
noncooperation on its own creates meanings among observers, though explanations help to crystalize 
the purposes of the actions or, semiotically speaking, select out denotations from a range of 
connotations. 
The third category of nonviolent action is nonviolent intervention, including for example sit-ins, 
fasts, overloading of facilities (such as hospitals), seizure of assets, alternative markets and parallel 
government. The level of coercion in these forms of nonviolent action is greater, but there are still 
important communicative dimensions. As with methods of noncooperation, methods of intervention 
send messages about commitment, organization and ability to act. The communicative dimensions of 
noncooperation and intervention are what anarchists call 'propaganda of the deed', in which the 
drama of action communicates without words. 
We have referred to the conventional distinction between principled and pragmatic nonviolence for 
convenience; in practice, the separation is far from rigid. As noted, Gandhi espoused a principled 
position but had a canny sense of what would be effective. On the other hand, many western activists 
who adopt a pragmatic position in organizing actions personally hold a principled position, though 
they may not advertise it. Furthermore, pragmatic uses of nonviolent action draw strength from a 
cultural rejection of violence (in certain circumstances), revealing a link between the principled and 
pragmatic orientations. 
This brief overview reveals that communication is a central element in nonviolent action, though the 
precise mechanism that communication plays in making nonviolent action effective varies from 
method to method and case to case. 
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Modes of Political Communication 
In order to gain insight into the distinguishing features of nonviolence as communication, it is 
helpful to make comparisons with other modes of political communication. Of the many ways of 
communicating politically, we select three for purposes of comparison: rational discourse, electoral 
politics and violence. Each of these lies on the other side of one of nonviolence's conceptual 
boundaries; given that nonviolence is a contested concept, in each case there are disputed areas near 
the boundary. 
The first boundary is between 'discourse' and 'action'. Nonviolent action involves action, namely 
doing something - from circulating a petition to striking - whereas discourse involves talking or 
some other means of symbolic communication. (For those who consider talking to be a form of 
action, the boundary can be said to be between 'discursive action' and 'supra-discursive action.') 
Many of the methods of symbolic action, such as writing letters, lie close to the action-discourse 
boundary. Rational discourse, which we have selected as a contrast to nonviolent action, is of course 
just one type of discourse. 
The second boundary is between conventional and nonconventional action. Conventional political 
action includes speeches, meetings, holding of elections, voting, political party formation, lobbying 
and much else that is considered normal or routine in countries with representative government. 
Nonviolent action, in contrast - as defined by its theorists - includes principally or only those forms 
of action that go beyond normal political behaviour. Boycotts and sit-ins, for example, are not part of 
the routine operation of the political system: they are not regular, predictable features of political life 
like elections or meetings of a political party branch; sometimes they are illegal. The category 
'conventional political action' depends on the context. In some polities, petitions, rallies or even 
strikes may become routine and unexceptional, whereas in others even a mild petition is treated by 
political leaders as a serious challenge. The category 'nonviolent action' is meant to capture the more 
challenging, nonroutine forms of action. 
The third boundary is between violence and nonviolence. Violence here refers to physical violence, 
such as beatings, imprisonment and killings: for discussing this boundary we set aside such usages as 
emotional violence and structural violence. Violence against physical objects is at the boundary, with 
debate over whether sabotage counts as nonviolent action. 
Table I shows the array of eight possibilities created by combining all three contrasts: discourse-
action, conventional-nonconventional and violence-nonviolence. 
  
Table I. Nonviolent action in conceptual space created by the contrasts discourse-action, 
conventional-nonconventional and violent-nonviolent. Typical examples are given in each 
category. 
 Nonviolent  Nonconventional  Conventional 
 Action Rallies, strikes and other 
forms of nonviolent action 
Elections, lobbying and 
other routine political 
actions 
 Discourse Strong emotional appeals Everyday conversation 
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Several of the entries in Table I could be contested, especially those for discourse, with 'violent 
discourse' a dubious category. Our main point, though, is to illustrate how nonviolent action is 
situated in relation to other activities. We now focus on the contrast between nonviolent action and 
three contrasting forms of political communication, namely rational discourse, electoral politics and 
terrorism. 
For many, rational discourse is an ideal mode of political communication (Habermas 1984, 1987), 
even if in reality it is only approximated occasionally. In rational discourse, participants eschew 
manipulation, emotionalism, special pleading and anything else that undermines an exchange on the 
basis of facts and logic. Arguably, this is the best way for members of a political community to reach 
agreements on sensible ways to live together, though we need not enter into the debates over the 
feasibility and desirability of rational discourse as a means or a goal in order to consider it, as an 
ideal type, as a mode of political communication. 
Electoral politics is a rather different mode of political communication. For the purposes here we can 
characterize electoral politics as a competition between parties (and candidates) for political office, 
in which elections are the primary means of selection. Electoral politics has several communicative 
dimensions. Most obviously, candidates and political parties seek to win the allegiance of voters 
through both direct communication, such as advertising and election speeches, and by implementing 
policies that are perceived as desirable. While some elements of electoral politics proceed on the 
basis of rational assessment of options, others are more manipulative, such as provision of special 
funding in crucial electorates ('pork-barrelling') and symbolic crusades against crime or foreigners, 
not to mention routine attempts to set agendas, put favourable glosses on actions (public relations 
and spin-doctoring) and in other ways achieve advantage over political opponents. 
A third method of political communication is violence. An example is terrorist attacks, a typical 
purpose of which is to communicate the existence and urgency of a particular group's grievances via 
the mass media. Indeed, terrorism can be conceived of as communication activated and amplified by 
violence (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982). Governments can also use violence as a form of 
communication, such as a massive police presence, arrests and brutality against protesters (whether 
the protesters are violent or nonviolent). Violence can also serve other functions, such as destruction 
of life and property or either disrupting or preserving order, but usually there are significant 
communicative dimensions. Indeed, in most cases certain meanings of violence are well understood, 
such as in warfare, though needless to say the meanings intended by users of violence are not always 
the same as those perceived by others. Those occasions when meanings are not clear, such as a 
'random shooting,' often are the most disturbing. 
Though far more could be said about each of these modes of political communication, this outline is 
enough for our purpose of comparing them. To make the comparison, we select six features that deal 
with elements of power and social change. They are listed here, each with an associated question. 
Dialogue: does the mode of communication foster a mutual exchange of information and 
perspectives?  
Means-ends compatibility: is the mode of communication (the means) compatible with the 
goal of the communication process (the end)?  
Opportunity for participation: is the mode of communication open to anyone who wants to use 
it?  
 Violent  Nonconventional  Conventional 
 Action Nonstate terrorism Police action, warfare 
 Discourse Personal verbal abuse Verbal abuse in sporting 
competitions 
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Scope for oppression: does the mode of communication have the capacity to harm or subjugate 
others?  
Power equalization: does the mode of communication have the capacity to reduce inequalities 
of power between participants?  
System transformation: does the mode of communication have the capacity to change social 
structures?  
Some preliminary assessments are given in Table II. 
  
Table II. Features of four modes of political communication 
Some of the entries in this table may be self-explanatory, while others could be the subject of 
extended debate. We offer here a few comments. 
Rational discourse is, above all, a method for use in dialogue (though it can also take the form of a 
monologue). Often, the goal is rational dialogue itself, in which case means-ends compatibility is 
built in. Another goal is rational action; this can be interpreted as 'discourse in action,' again 
satisfying means-ends compatibility. Most people can engage in rational discourse, though some are 
limited by poor skills. On the other hand, rational discourse has little power in itself, either to 
oppress, to redistribute power or to transform systems. 
Electoral politics, as mentioned earlier, is based only in part on rational discourse, hence only 
partially satisfies dialogism and means-ends compatibility. Most adults can participate as voters, but 
only a small minority participates as elected officials. Electoral politics has some scope for 
oppression, especially of outsider groups such as ethnic minorities and prisoners. However, the 
electoral process provides opportunities for challenging oppression affecting or opposed by the 
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majority. There is some scope for power redistribution, such as through progressive taxation or 
policies supporting women, but the actual experience of electoral politics shows that radical power 
redistribution is unusual and that redistribution may be in favour of the rich and powerful. Finally, 
electoral politics is seldom self-transformative; it can be argued that it operates as a brake on further 
democratization (Ginsberg, 1982). 
Nonviolent action is designed to foster dialogue. Symbolic actions are dialogic by their nature, while 
methods of noncooperation and intervention typically operate to pressure opponents to enter a 
dialogue or to take an existing dialogue more seriously. Nonviolent means are compatible with the 
end, a nonviolent society. Participation in many methods of nonviolent action is open to anyone 
without regard to sex, age or ability. Nonviolent action has a low capacity to oppress, yet its capacity 
to redistribute power and transform systems is potentially large, as shown for example by its role in 
the collapse of communist regimes in 1989 (Randle, 1991; Roberts, 1991) or in toppling dictators 
(Parkman, 1990; Zunes, 1994). 
Violence rates low on dialogism: there is no further dialogue if the opponent is killed! Likewise, the 
goal of violence is almost always something other than a violent world, so means-ends compatibility 
is low. Participation is typically limited, with young fit men far more likely to participate. Violence 
has a high potential for oppression. It also has a large capacity to redistribute power and transform 
systems, as shown by numerous violent revolutions. 
These modes of political communication could be compared on other grounds and with greater 
nuance, but this short assessment is sufficient to show some key similarities and differences between 
the modes. What distinguishes nonviolent action is its high transformative potential while remaining 
dialogic and participatory. Another way of looking at this is to note that nonviolent action has the 
potential for direct dialogue, as in rational discourse, as well as the potential for redressing power 
imbalances and inequitable systems, which are the structural impediments to dialogue between 
equals. 
  
Dimensions of Nonviolence as Communication 
Most of the attention in the nonviolence literature is on the effect of nonviolent action on opponents. 
As noted earlier, Gandhi saw the key effect as conversion, whereas Sharp saw a range of effects, 
from persuasion to coercion. Looking at nonviolence as communication is a convenient way of 
bringing out other effects of nonviolent action. We proceed by looking at nonviolent action as a 
means to promote dialogue, asking, in particular, with whom does the dialogue occur? 
In relation to opponents, nonviolent action plays a double role in relation to dialogue: it is both a 
direct attempt at dialogue - most obviously in methods of symbolic action - and preparation for 
dialogue. In canonical nonviolent action, activists initially seek to resolve problems through 
dialogue, but when the opponent refuses to discuss matters, operates in bad faith or uses violence, 
nonviolent action becomes a means to encourage the opponent to enter dialogue (Naess, 1974: 90-
93). In such cases, nonviolent action is a means for power equalization, which can be seen as 
preparation for a dialogue between equals, in which rational discourse is a more reasonable prospect.
Another target audience for nonviolence as communication is third parties. If opponents are not 
receptive, groups that are not involved may be, and their influence on the opponent can be decisive. 
Galtung (1989: 13-33) calls this process of indirect influence 'the great chain of nonviolence'. [4] As 
noted earlier, nonviolent action in the salt satyagraha had its main effect on the British colonial rulers 
indirectly, via news reports that awakened the concern of citizens in Britain, USA and elsewhere. 
Galtung conceives of the great chain as a psychological process: when there is too great a 
psychological distance between activists and opponents, intermediaries can bridge the gap. The 
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process can also be conceptualized as a communication chain (Martin & Varney, 2003): if direct 
communication is blocked for whatever reason (physical barriers, language, meaning systems), 
intermediaries can constitute a communication channel that carries the message. Because the British 
colonial rulers and their agents had so little respect for the Indian population, direct communications 
from satyagrahis had little impact. The news reports took Gandhi's message to a more receptive 
audience in other countries, members of which were able to communicate directly to those running 
Britain's colonial empire. 
Another dimension of nonviolence as communication is communication within the group of 
nonviolent activists and supporters. On a practical level, communication among activists is necessary 
to decide on and coordinate actions. This process is closely linked to what is commonly called 
empowerment, a topic that surprisingly has been neglected within the nonviolence literature (Kraft & 
Speck, 2000). It is well known to activists that a well-planned and executed nonviolent action can be 
tremendously empowering. This comes through the experience of participating in action against 
perceived injustice, which gives rise to satisfying feelings of solidarity and mutual validation, though 
such desirable outcomes do not occur for all participants or in all actions. 
One aspect of the empowerment process is communication, which can be between activists, between 
activists and opponents, and between activists and third parties. Previously we talked about the effect 
of communication on opponents, who are the recipients of activists' messages (in the form of 
nonviolent action); here we are concerned with the effect on activists themselves. Those who 
participate in and support nonviolent actions are, in essence, communicating with themselves via 
their actions, revealing to each other their own power to act and to make a difference. The supportive 
response of other activists provides validation for their actions and beliefs (Colquhoun & Martin, 
2001), creating the experience of empowerment. Routine communication among activists prior to 
and during actions is usually linked to this validation and empowerment. 
Another aspect of collective empowerment occurs when nonparticipants who witness nonviolent 
actions become aware that their views are more widely shared than they realized. When censorship 
or social pressure restricts the expression of political sympathies, it is possible for action to trigger a 
rapid expansion in overt support. 
Closely related to collective empowerment is the effect of nonviolent action on the individual, which 
can be called individual empowerment. As well as the validation received from others, many 
activists gain an inner sense of meaning, well-being and strength through participation in nonviolent 
action. For casual participants this may be fleeting, but for those who become more engaged or who 
join in particularly large, dramatic or dangerous actions, the experience can transform one's sense of 
self. For instance, a sit-in against desegregation in a Woolworths store in Greensboro, North 
Carolina in 1960 left participants with 'a powerful sense of confidence and self-esteem … as they 
overcame their innermost fears to make a public stand' (Cook, 1998: 114). 
There are various ways to articulate the process of individual empowerment, some drawn from 
spiritual traditions; one of them is that a person has communicated with their most inner or deep self. 
In other words, individual empowerment, especially of a transformative kind, can be interpreted as a 
process of inner communication. 
Table III lists the various dimensions of nonviolence as communication that we have just outlined. 
  
Table III. Dimensions of nonviolence as communication 
1. Conversion, persuasion, symbolic action: dialogue with opponents
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2. Power equalization via noncooperation and intervention: preparation for dialogue with opponents 
3. Mobilization of third parties: the chain of nonviolence 
4. Collective empowerment: dialogue within activist groups 
5. Individual empowerment: inner dialogue 
  
Although we have emphasized the communicative dimensions of nonviolence, there are other 
conceptual frames for each of these processes, as suggested by some of the words in Table III such 
as 'power equalization', 'mobilization' and 'empowerment'. Different frameworks for conceptualizing 
these processes each have their own advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of a 
communication framework is the highlighting of communication channels (such as via a chain of 
nonviolence) and of the importance of shared meanings. 
The history of thinking about the operation of nonviolent action can be interpreted as a changing of 
ideas about communication. In the Gandhian model, the actions of satyagrahis, themselves based on 
rigorous adherence to 'truth', are supposed to penetrate directly into the consciousness of opponents, 
leading to conversion. But without shared systems of meaning, this did not occur so often. The 
pragmatic approach to nonviolence eliminated reliance on conversion, instead proposing a range of 
methods for persuasion and nonviolent coercion. In the pragmatic picture, communication operates 
to a considerable extent through the demonstration to the opponent of the cohesiveness and power of 
the activists. While the pragmatic approach includes direct communication through symbolic actions, 
the issue of shared meanings is not put central stage. This is addressed by Galtung's great chain of 
nonviolence, reconceptualized as a chain of speech situations, each one of which is closer to ideal (in 
terms of meanings and power) than the direct activist-opponent channel. All these approaches have 
focussed primarily on changing the opponent's beliefs and behaviours. It is only recently that much 
attention has been placed on nonviolent action's role in social empowerment, [5] a process that can 
be interpreted as dialogue between nonviolent activists. Finally, the issue of individual 
empowerment takes us full circle back to the Gandhian perspective. However, for Gandhi, individual 
empowerment, or inner peace, was a prerequisite for nonviolent action, and this view is commonly 
held today by advocates of principled nonviolence. The additional point we note here is that 
individual empowerment can (also) be a result of participation in nonviolent action. This has long 
been widely recognized by activists but has not received much attention from researchers in the 
pragmatic approach to nonviolent action. A focus on communication provides one window into the 
process. 
However, a communication perspective on nonviolence also has weaknesses, most obviously in not 
highlighting the role of power that is correctly emphasized in analyses using the pragmatic approach. 
The risk in studying nonviolence through a communication lens is to focus so much on discourse that 
crucial power dimensions are neglected. We think that it can be helpful to look at nonviolence as 
communication, but this is only one way to gain insight into nonviolence. 
To illustrate the various communicative dimensions of nonviolence, we use two examples of 
nonviolent action in the Soviet Union: resistance to the 1991 coup and strikes at Soviet forced labour 
camps in 1953. In each case, we briefly outline the events and then analyse them in terms of the five 
dimensions of nonviolence as communication listed in Table III. 
  
Communication in the 1991 Soviet Coup
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On 18 August 1991, a group calling itself the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the 
USSR detained Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in his Crimean dacha and launched a coup. The 
next morning, decrees by the Committee were announced over the media, political parties other than 
the Communist Party banned, opposition media outlets closed, arrests of activists and liberal 
politicians initiated, and tanks sent to the centre of Moscow. There were eight figures in the 
Emergency Committee, with Soviet Vice-President Gennadi Yanayev the nominal leader. The coup 
was an attempt to curb reforms, especially those concerning autonomy for the republics, and to 
impose greater centralised control as in the years before glasnost and perestroika. 
Opponents used a range of nonviolent actions and within three days the coup collapsed for want of 
popular support and military back-up (Foye, 1992). There is ample evidence that communication 
played a central role in the struggle (Ganley, 1996: 122-219). The contemporaneous media coverage 
and commentary on the coup made it a type of 'instant history' (Gerbner, 1993). 
Some commentators have said that the coup failed because the coup leaders were bumblers who 
were ill prepared for their task (Ganley, 1996: 129-135; Kotkin, 2001: 97-103). Others, though, 
believe the coup was well organised and fairly widely supported (Billington, 1992: 34; Miller, 1992: 
72). Pozner (1992: 214) says that the coup leaders 'had everything going for them: the armed forces, 
the KGB, the Party, the police' and the precedent of the Soviet people's acceptance of authority. 
From this perspective, popular resistance was crucial to the coup's failure. Sixsmith (1991: 146) 
concludes that 'the most likely explanation for the plotters' indecision and seeming lack of nerve is 
that they were never prepared for anything other than a palace coup' as in the 1964 toppling of Nikita 
Khrushchev. Relatively few citizens took action against the coup, with most continuing with life as 
usual (Billington, 1992: 32; Loory & Imse, 1991: 108-109; Pozner, 1992: 78; Sixsmith, 1991: 42). 
Nevertheless, citizens who openly opposed the coup contributed to military and KGB 
insubordination, which was central to the coup's failure. 
   
1. Conversion, Persuasion, Symbolic action: Dialogue with Opponents 
The focal point of the resistance to the coup was a continuous rally outside the Russian parliament 
building in Moscow beginning Monday 19 August. There were also demonstrations elsewhere and a 
range of other actions. Symbols of resistance, present in most actions, were particularly vivid in anti-
coup graffiti and slogans. 
Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian republic, soon came to fill a de facto leadership role in the 
resistance. Yeltsin did not engage in direct dialogue with the coup leaders, but attendance at anti-
coup demonstrations - despite bans and curfews - the setting up of alternative newspapers, mass 
leafleting and strikes carried the message of refusal to acknowledge the coup's legitimacy, without a 
word needing to be spoken directly to the coup perpetrators. 
In keeping with their attempt to make the coup appear legitimate, Yanayev and his co-conspirators 
held a media conference at which journalists were able to ask questions (Black, 1993: 189-198; 
Ganley, 1996: 129-130; Sixsmith, 1991: 22-26). The critical content and tone of journalists' 
questions can be interpreted as a form of persuasion. At the conference, Yanayev's hands perceptibly 
trembled; jokes about this quickly spread around the country, helping undermine the credibility of 
the coup. 
An important method of persuasion is fraternization, which involves using personal influence to put 
pressure on soldiers. It can include processes such as outlining and discussing dilemmas, solidifying 
doubts, enumerating options, and giving positive voice to the worth of taking action. Resistance 
movements have often tried to win the support of soldiers, unsuccessfully in the case of mass 
demonstrations in Burma in the 1980s (Aung San Suu Kyi, 1997) and China in 1989 (Simmie & 
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Nixon, 1989), and successfully in the cases of the defeat of the Kapp Putsch in Germany in 1920 
(Goodspeed, 1962) and 'people power' in the Philippines in 1986 (Thompson, 1995), to give just 
some examples. 
In the case of the Soviet coup, resisters at mass rallies stood shoulder to shoulder with soldiers, 
pleading, persuading, cajoling, demanding that they support their struggle and not the coup. As 
bonds formed and tensions lessened, symbolism was evident, from the niceties of sharing sweets, 
jokes and cups of tea to the more pronounced signs of flowers decking the tanks (Freidin, 1994: 74). 
Randle (1994: 110-115) claims that less polarized conditions are more conducive to conversion. 
Protesters at most anti-coup demonstrations worked hard to keep the lines of communication open, 
sometimes with jokes, sometimes with forceful argument, but always in a way that allowed empathy 
to build. When asked if he would shoot if ordered to do so, one soldier expressed such empathy in 
his reply: 'You know, I'm Russian, just like all of them. I think I'd rather go to jail than shoot at my 
own people' (Attard, 1997: 182-183). 
General Konstantin Kobets, assigned by Yeltsin to defend parliament, organized a more systematic 
process of fraternization (Billington, 1992: 39-40; Sixsmith, 1991: 40-41), enlisting Russian 
parliamentarians to team up with uniformed soldiers and approach army units, encouraging them to 
defect. Kobets and others phoned fellow officers to gain their support (Billington, 1992: 39; Loory 
and Imse, 1991: 108). Some Supreme Soviet Deputies visited military bases and installations to tell 
armed forces personnel about Yeltsin's speech and to urge them to support the resistance. The All-
Union Soviet of the Parents of Military Personnel also called on the armed forces to oppose the coup.
The fraternization efforts, plus the symbolic effect of popular opposition, inhibited violence. The 
elite Alpha Group of the KGB, assigned the task of capturing the Russian parliament building, did 
not go through with its plan (Billington, 1992: 41; Loory & Imse, 1991: 124-125, 138-139), since it 
anticipated killing several thousand defenders. According to Pozner (1992: 175), 'These men did not 
want to take responsibility for spilling the blood of their brothers and sisters. As one of them told me, 
"My son could have been with the defenders; so could have my brother, or lover, or wife. I was not 
going to risk killing them".' There was no direct fraternization with members of the Alpha Group; it 
was the symbolic power of open protest that served as a form of persuasion. 
There were many other attempts at persuasion. A makeshift radio studio was set up in the Russian 
parliament building; broadcasts were taped and sent to factories and schools in Moscow (Billington, 
1992: 102; Sixsmith, 1991: 19). Protesters put up posters and stood on street corners and in subways 
circulating leaflets and underground newspapers. Even non-media institutions became involved in 
mass circulation. Workers at the Kirov tractor factory in Leningrad used fax machines at the plant to 
transmit speeches of defiance and support and to call for a campaign of civil disobedience. The 
Mayor of Ryazan ran off twenty thousand copies of Yeltsin's decrees. Ham radios were brought out 
of mothballs and re-employed to receive and transmit details of resistance (Loory & Imse, 1991: 
106). Leningrad taxi drivers were even more directly involved, using their taxis and taxi radios to 
organize themselves into a fleet to watch for and report on tanks and other signs of possible attack. 
In Moscow, couriers on bikes performed a similar role, as well as transmitting messages between 
resisters. A hot line was set up and people invited to report troop movements and to give information 
on picking up frequencies to stay one step ahead of the jamming undertaken by the putschists 
(Gambrell, 1991; Rebezov & Guskov, 1991). Around the tunnels of Moscow's Metro, the little card 
tables normally laden with wares were 'replaced by crowds around broadsides issued not from the 
presses of Pravda but from desktop publishers using their computers and laser printers to put 
together bits of news scavenged from rumor and electronic gateways to the West' (Valauskas, 1992). 
Computer networks remained unsevered and were well utilized to spread information widely and 
quickly (Ganley, 1996: 186-189; Travica & Hogan, 1992). 
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2. Power Equalization via Noncooperation and Intervention: Preparation for Dialogue with 
Opponents 
As tanks rolled towards the centre of Moscow, civilians stood in the way: the tank drivers then took 
other routes (Sixsmith, 1991: 13-14). Noncooperation was also evident in defiance of curfews, 
refusal to obey orders and the compromising and re-interpreting of orders. Strikes, for example in the 
coal-mining regions of Siberia and the important military-industrial complex of Gorky, were another 
form of noncooperation (Attard, 1997: 184). 
Alternative institutions, a form of nonviolent intervention, were most notable at the Russian 
parliament building, which quickly became an alternative centre of control, and the media (Ganley, 
1996: 153-183). The coup leaders shut down all but nine publications. Most of these nine supported 
the plotters, but journalists and printers at Izvestiya demanded that Yeltsin's viewpoint be printed, 
leading the editor to allow Yeltsin's opposition and call for a general strike to be printed (Izyumov, 
1992: 27; Sixsmith, 1991: 18-19). Journalists from suspended newspapers produced makeshift 
newspapers and leaflets. On 19 August, workers from the independent newspaper Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, defying the ban on their paper, prepared a four-page proof, only to find that the state printing 
office would not print it. Undeterred, they faxed the proofs to France, where the text was translated 
and published. That night Nezavisimaya Gazeta workers put together a bulletin called A Chronicle of 
Events of August 19-20, a play on the name of a well-known samizdat publication, and posted a 
thousand copies of it, along with other newsletters and leaflets, in visible places around Moscow 
(Ganley, 1996: 155-156). Stronger transmitters were brought to Moscow and slipped into the 
Russian parliament building so that broadcasts could be extended in power, received by local 
stations across the country and rebroadcast (Ganley, 1996: 141). These are examples of 
noncooperation and intervention as direct preparation for communication. 
  
3. Mobilization of Third Parties: The Chain of Nonviolence 
In the case of Gandhi's salt march, reports of police assaults on marchers put in motion the dynamics 
of political jiu-jitsu: nonviolent resisters were perceived to occupy the moral high ground and 
observers (either in person or through the media) were won over to their cause (Sharp, 1973; Martin, 
Varney & Vickers, 2001). These third parties in turn put pressure on British colonial rulers, 
completing a chain of nonviolence between the activists and their ultimate opponents. Had Soviet 
soldiers brutally assaulted or opened fire on resisters to the coup, a similar process might have 
occurred. But due to the soldiers' restraint and the short duration of the coup, mobilization of third 
parties played a relatively small role in the coup. Initially, US president George Bush gave only tepid 
criticism of the coup, suggesting that it might be possible to work with the new leader Yanayev. 
Pozner's (1992: 80) dismayed response was to ask, 'But was that really the best he could do?' But as 
opposition to the coup became apparent, US government rhetoric against it became stronger 
(Crowley, 1991; Ganley, 1996: 145-146; Sixsmith, 1991: 177). 
Although the US government's overt stance did little to undermine the coup, there was a powerful 
indirect influence. According to Sixsmith (1991: 145), the coup leaders realized that they could only 
gain international support - needed to obtain economic assistance - if they gained power quickly and 
bloodlessly. This is a key reason why Yanayev and his fellow conspirators tried to justify the coup 
constitutionally and why they minimised their use of force. Hence the death of three Moscow 
protesters in a complex confrontation on 20 August (Loory & Imse, 1991: 134-146; Sixsmith, 1991: 
41-43) - even though other protesters in the clash were aggressive - was a serious blow to the coup. It 
might be said, then, that the coup leaders' path was shaped by the existence of a potential chain of 
nonviolence. This in turn meant that a relatively limited degree of resistance was enough to bring 
down the coup. 
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At an individual level, some opponents of the coup obtained immediate international support via e-
mail (Ganley, 1996: 186-189). The connections between communication and morale are evident in 
some e-mail messages to people in other countries: 'Anyway, our main communication line is still 
open and it makes us more optimistic'; 'You can't even imagine how grateful we are for your help 
and support in this terrible time! The best thing is to know that we aren't alone' (Press, 1991: 23). 
These are not examples of a completed chain of nonviolence but do show how communication to 
third parties can contribute to empowerment. 
  
4. Collective Empowerment: Dialogue within Activist Groups 
There was communication among resisters to the coup through various media: face-to-face at rallies, 
by radio among taxi drivers, and by e-mail. Several observers suggest that collective empowerment 
occurred especially when groups witnessed symbolic resistance or when successes occurred. A key 
symbolic event for the resistance was Yeltsin's mounting of a tank outside the Russian parliament 
and giving a speech encouraging defiance of the coup (Ganley, 1996: 147-148; Sixsmith, 1991: 15). 
Pozner (1992: 89-90) says that 'it was the best kind of grandstand move possible, because it brought 
hope. … It spoke to our pride and to those things that had been taken away - to our sense of self-
respect, to our identity'. Sixsmith (1991: 29) reports that sharing food and drink at the barricades was 
'a simple act of communion, of giving and taking, which made us all feel part of a common cause'. 
When a dozen tanks defected to the resistance, 'An overwhelming feeling of relief, that we were not 
alone against the world after all, swept through the crowd' (Sixsmith 1991: 30; see also Billington 
1992: 40). Billington (1992: 41) reports a carnival atmosphere at the rally, at which speeches 
inspired cheers and tears (1992: 57). According to Sixsmith (1991: 30), 'The public address system 
turned out to be a vital tool: it kept the spirit of communal responsibility going, and it helped defuse 
the circulation of rumours and scare stories', though it was also used for morale-boosting but false 
information. 
Leaders play an important role in collective empowerment, often playing a central role in 
communication within the movement. In the form of nonviolence espoused by Gandhi, leaders 
achieve high levels of spiritual purity and make significant sacrifices before taking on leadership 
roles. Yeltsin was not such a leader (Reddaway & Glinski, 2001). Rather he appears to have been 
motivated by his own political ambitions and, though he was inspirational in the resistance to the 
coup, it seems that he was capable of manipulating moods and opportunities. Yeltsin embraced the 
nonviolent approach because, opposed by a huge military force, there was no other viable option. 
Though he gave rhetoric to democracy, Yeltsin's approach did not appear to embrace the 
participatory advantages of nonviolent action. 
  
5. Individual Empowerment: Inner Dialogue 
Though it is reasonable to infer that some level of individual empowerment occurs in any successful 
nonviolent action - such as fraternizing with soldiers or organizing a strike - the direct evidence for 
this during the resistance to the Soviet coup is limited. Vladimir Pozner, a well-known Soviet 
television broadcaster, gives a personal account that is relevant here. He was asked by many foreign 
media to give interviews, but he hesitated due to worries about what might happen to him (Pozner, 
1992: 91-92). Despising himself for his reservations, he eventually agreed to interviews. 
Immediately after this decision, he felt personally empowered: 'I was feeling a joy as great as I had 
ever experienced. In this time of darkness, my spirits were soaring, my soul was singing. The fear 
was gone, conquered now I knew forever." (Pozner, 1992: 99). 
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Communication in Soviet Labour Camps, 1953 
Prison camps were set up by the Bolsheviks soon after the October 1917 revolution. [6] The scale of 
imprisonment expanded enormously beginning in the late 1920s, with most prisoners forced to 
labour, especially in mining, logging and building. From the 1930s through the mid 1950s there were 
millions of prisoners in numerous camps around the country, with large numbers dying due to 
overwork, extreme climate, disease and malnutrition. The camps included common criminals - some 
convicted of serious crimes, others of no more than stealing food during famine conditions - and 
political prisoners. After World War II, large numbers of soldiers who had been captured by the 
Nazis, plus opponents of Soviet rule such as members of Ukrainian nationalist organizations, were 
sent to labour camps. Due to the arduous conditions and brutality, effective resistance was extremely 
difficult to organize. In the 1930s there were hunger strikes, though with little successful outcome. In 
the late 1940s there was a major armed revolt involving tens of thousands of prisoners, nearly all of 
whom were killed (Ivanova, 2000: 106). 
In March 1953, Stalin died, leading to high expectations among prisoners of relief from their ordeal. 
However, the government's initial amnesty, at the end of the month, applied mainly to nonpolitical 
prisoners. In this tense situation, abuses by camp personnel were the trigger for a series of strikes 
(Craveri, 1997: 367-368; Ivanova, 2000: 176). Some months later, the arrest of Beria, head of the 
MVD that ran the camps, bolstered prisoners' willingness to defy the authorities. 
We focus here on the 1953 strikes at Norilsk and Vorkuta; there was also a major uprising at Kengir 
in 1954 (Solzhenitsyn, 1978: 285-331). The authorities used force, including massacres, to end the 
strikes, but a number of the strikers' demands were met subsequently (Craveri, 1997: 377). Unlike 
the fate of earlier resisters, strike leaders at Norilsk and Vorkuta were not executed but instead put on 
trial; many of them were acquitted. 
  
1. Conversion, Persuasion, Symbolic action: Dialogue with Opponents 
At some of the Norilsk and Vorkuta camps, strikers prepared sets of demands, such as for releasing 
certain categories of prisoners, the right to write letters once a month, and removal of numbers from 
their uniforms (Buca, 1976: 255-257). One reason for the moderate nature of most of their demands 
was to help win over their opponents. A commission from Moscow was sent to hear the strikers' 
grievances but, because it was composed only of generals and MVD officials, it was received only in 
some camps. 
The strikers also made efforts to persuade camp guards of the worthiness of their case. Given that 
machine guns were trained on them, it was important to avoid providing any excuse for an attack on 
the prisoners. Buca (1976: 236), the leader of the resistance at camp 29, told his collaborators to 
speak politely to guards even when they were rude, to keep calm and avoid incidents. In some of 
Buca's speeches to prisoners, he intended guards to overhear what he said so that they would be 
aware of the prisoners' good intentions. At Buca's camp, the prisoners cooperated with authorities - 
for example in relation to mine safety and bread-making - to keep the camp going and win allies. 
  
2. Power Equalization via Noncooperation and Intervention: Preparation for Dialogue with 
Opponents 
Striking, a form of noncooperation, was the principal means of nonviolent action used by the 
prisoners. It had a potent effect. The strikes were a direct challenge to the MVD's control. In 
addition, there was an economic effect since the camps were an integrated part of the Soviet 
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economy, even though, despite its low labour costs, the Gulag was less productive on average than 
the rest of the Soviet economy (Ivanova, 2000: 189). Other means of nonviolent action were refusing 
to obey orders and setting up camp committees run by prisoners. 
The strikes seemed to work well as a means of promoting dialogue. Rather than immediately exert 
force to break the strikes, the camp authorities temporarily adapted to the new situation, for example 
by providing the usual food rations. Their responses were influenced by political uncertainty in the 
aftermath of Stalin's death. Visits to the camps by a commission from Moscow represented the 
success of the strikes in inducing the authorities to engage in dialogue. The interactions that 
eventuated were far from an engagement between equals, but this cannot be expected when using 
nonviolent action to prepare for dialogue. 
  
3. Mobilization of Third Parties: The Chain of Nonviolence 
The strikers made attempts to win over third parties. At Norilsk, strikers prepared banners to be hung 
on their barracks, with messages aimed at local free inhabitants. They also attached their messages to 
kites and designed them to drop them over the city of Norilsk. The importance of communicating to 
the outside world is suggested by attempts by guards, using their own kites, to prevent the kite-
dissemination of messages (Graziosi, 1992: 433-434). The authorities also used propaganda to 
nearby communities to counter communication from prisoners. 
Mobilization of third parties could also occur through other chains, for example sympathetic guards 
talking to local people, relatives or superiors. There is little evidence of the scale or impact of such 
chains. This suggests that mobilization of third parties was limited, with most of the action involving 
prisoners, the MVD and high levels of the Communist Party. 
  
4. Collective Empowerment: Dialogue within Activist Groups 
Within the camps, there were immense obstacles to achieving any sort of solidarity among prisoners, 
who were divided by nationality and politics and physically weakened by the punishing work and 
meagre rations. The camp authorities used various means to divide the prisoners from each other, 
including spreading rumours, rewarding criminal prisoners who collaborated with the authorities and 
transporting actual or potential challengers to other camps or putting them in isolation cells. 
Communication among the prisoners was thus absolutely essential to building the solidarity 
necessary to launch and maintain the strikes. Buca (1976: 237) reports that he had agents in all 41 
huts at Vorkuta camp 29 to report on possible problems such as quarrels between different 
nationalities. The MVD approached some prisoners who left that camp to attend to mine safety with 
the aim of gaining their assistance to assassinate Buca, but the prisoners informed him and he was 
able to take precautions. Internal solidarity and communication thus helped forestall plans by the 
authorities to undermine the strike by taking out the leader. Scholmer (1954) reports that the MVD 
let empty trucks run between the pit head and the slag heap to give the appearance, to neighbouring 
camps, that the pit was still working, thus aiming to reduce the prisoners' sense of solidarity. 
For communication between camps, Buca (1976: 230) reports that prisoners scratched messages on 
the sides of rail wagons and, less specifically, communicated 'by pre-arranged channels through the 
co-operation of free workers' (Buca, 1976: 252). Another method was to write messages on tree 
trunks that were brought in from other areas (Graziosi, 1992: 426). The MVD policy of continually 
transferring prisoners to other camps, as a means of inhibiting the development of resistance 
organizations, also had the effect of allowing news from one camp to get to others, including 
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information about resistance (Graziosi, 1992: 426). 
  
5. Individual Empowerment: Inner Dialogue 
Although there is little direct evidence of inner dialogue, it is plausible to infer some degree of 
individual empowerment from the actions taken by the strikers. Buca (1976: 259) says that as the 
camp authorities openly prepared to attack, most prisoners preferred to die rather than return to 
work. (As it happened, dozens died and many more were injured in the massacre at camp 29.) From 
his account, Buca seems to have been highly motivated in his role as leader of the strike at that 
camp, for example spending several days with little sleep, being concerned every hour about the 
complex organizational and tactical challenges of maintaining the strike. 
  
Conclusion 
Looking at nonviolent action through a communication lens provides insight into its special 
characteristics and different dimensions. Nonviolent action can be conceptualized as a form of 
political communication that is distinctive - compared, for example, with rational discourse, electoral 
politics, and violence - in its commitment to dialogue combined with the capacity for system 
transformation. 
We have proposed that nonviolence as communication can usefully be divided into five dimensions: 
conversion, power equalization, mobilization of third parties, collective empowerment and 
individual empowerment. The first dimension, including processes of conversion, persuasion and 
symbolic action, contains the most obvious ways in which nonviolence is a form of communication. 
The second dimension, power equalization via noncooperation and nonviolent intervention, can be 
considered to comprise ways of preparing for dialogue. (This is separate from the more directly 
symbolic aspects of noncooperation and intervention.) On the other hand, noncooperation and 
intervention serve as means of nonviolent coercion that supplement or replace dialogue with the 
exercise of power. This is one important way in which nonviolence is more than just communication.
The third dimension of nonviolence as communication is mobilization of third parties, often through 
what Galtung (1989) calls the great chain of nonviolence, which can be thought of as a 
communication chain. The chain gets around power inequalities by utilizing a series of links, each of 
which is closer to power equality than the direct connection between resisters and their opponents. 
The fourth and fifth dimensions, collective and individual empowerment, are often neglected in 
studies of nonviolent action that focus on influencing opponents. Yet in many nonviolent actions, 
such as the familiar petition or rally, the major impact is not on outsiders but on participants. 
Communication in these cases is primarily inward rather than outward. These dimensions of 
nonviolence deserve far more attention. 
Our case studies from the Soviet Union, namely resistance to the 1991 coup and the 1953 strikes at 
Norilsk and Vorkuta, illustrate the dimensions of nonviolence as communication but also reveal the 
limitations of the five-dimension framework. Many actions mix two or more dimensions, such as 
strikes that prepared the way for dialogue and resulted in collective and individual empowerment. 
Attention to the communicative dimensions of nonviolence can serve as a warning to activists that 
nonviolent actions do not 'speak for themselves'. Communication is a process of creating meanings, 
so struggles over this process are central to the impact of nonviolent action. For example, 
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governments can try to dismiss, discredit and undermine activists by confiscating records, 
censorship, putting pressure on the media, public relations, spreading rumours and producing 
disinformation. Therefore, activists should not allow communication issues to become secondary to 
what they call 'action', but should address struggles over meaning as central to their efforts. This was 




[1]  In our examination of the nonviolence and communication literatures, we have discovered a 
couple of significant contributions - Bode (1994) and Ramana Murti (1968) - with nothing 
emanating from communication scholars. It is possible, though, that additional work exists of which 
we are unaware. 
[2] We use the terminology of creating or sharing meanings rather than the more technical terms 
familiar to semioticians. 
[3] Other accounts of nonviolence in the pragmatic tradition include Ackerman & DuVall (2000), 
Ackerman & Kruegler (1994), Cooney & Michalowski (1987), Crow et al. (1990) and McManus & 
Schlabach (1991). 
[4] Galtung (1989: 24) appears to apply the adjective 'great' to his chain-of-nonviolence hypothesis 
by analogy to the Great Chain of Being. See, for example, Lovejoy (1950). 
[5] War Resisters' International sponsored an e-discussion on nonviolence and social empowerment 
and held a conference in India in February 2001. See http://www.wri-irg.org/nvse/nvsehome.htm. 
[Note added after publication: Sharp (1973: 777-799), in his comprehensive analysis of nonviolent 
action, discussed empowerment at some length.] 
[6] For general information about Soviet labour camps and the strikes, we draw on Craveri (1997), 
Ivanova (2000) and Solzhenitsyn (1974, 1975, 1978). Memoirs of strike participants (Buca, 1976; 
Scholmer 1954) give an inside perspective on communication in the camps, though the 
representativeness of these accounts is open to question. Graziosi (1992) is an historian's assessment 
based largely on memoir sources. We thank a referee who is an expert on Soviet labour camps for 
valuable assistance on facts and sources. 
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